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he growth enjoyed by Europe’s financial sector in 
recent years rendered the question of the future of its 
financial centres almost superfluous. It seemed as if 
many financial centres would continue to prosper in Europe 
– whether big or small, or specialised or regional. Recently, 
however, the meaning of the phrase ‘single market’ for 
financial centres has begun to take on another connotation. 
As the real impact of the directives arising from the EU’s 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) starts to permeate the 
market, competition will inevitably increase, resulting in 
some possibly painful adjustment processes. 
‘Single’ may also mean rationalisation for financial centres, 
meaning that as national borders gradually become less 
important in the EU and as competition intensifies, financial 
centres of the EU member states will also face intensified 
competition. The role played as a financial centre by some 
places that lack critical mass or specialisation may decline 
and be transferred to more competitive, neighbouring cities.  
The intention of this article is to subject European financial 
centres to a SWOT analysis, assessing their Strengths, 
Weaknesses,  Opportunities and Threats. We start with a 
closer definition of the term financial centre and a 
classification of the different kinds of financial centres found 
in Europe. A second section analyses the extent to which EU 
legislation and in particular the FSAP may lead to an 
intensification of financial centre competition. In a final 
section, we make some assessments for the future. 
What is in a name? 
The term ‘financial centre’ is widely used but not often well 
defined. When is a place a financial centre? Small islands are 
often called financial centres, whereas large capitals of 
certain EU member states are hardly seen as such. Overall, 
the term is used for places where the financial sector plays a 
dominant role in the local economy, defined in the share of 
GDP or national income derived from financial services, 
and/or in total employment, in the number of financial 
institutions, etc. But there is no commonly accepted 
definition. In colloquial terms, a place is called a financial 
centre if it corresponds to most of the following 
characteristics: it hosts an exchange, houses the head office 
of several large financial institutions, a reputed supervisory 
authority, and/or a central bank, and boasts an important 
number of law firms and consulting companies. 
Within financial centres, further distinctions can be made. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2000) distinguishes 
three groups of financial centres: 
•  International financial centres (IFCs) offer the full 
range of financial services, are characterised by deep and 
liquid markets with diverse sources and uses of funds, 
supporting large domestic economies (e.g. London, New 
York and Tokyo), hosting several internationally active 
banks. They have the regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks to safeguard the reliability of contractual 
relationships and the integrity of the financial system. 
•  Regional financial centres (RFCs) feature well-
developed financial markets and infrastructure, 
associated with smaller domestic economies, and more 
regionally focused banks, which intermediate funds in 
and out of their regions. 
•  Offshore financial centres (OFCs) are much smaller and 
provide more limited specialist services. It refers to 
countries or territories where the financial sector is large 
as compared to the domestic economy, moderately 
regulated, taxed at a low level and providing services 
mainly to non-residents.  
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Another useful distinction is between functional centres, 
where the financial sector is serving a dynamic real 
economy, and booking  centres, which mainly serve as 
intermediaries for transactions where the underlying value is 
created elsewhere (Walter, 1998). Walter also distinguishes 
between functions of financial centres that are subject to 
agglomeration effects, and others that are not. Front office 
functions, such as securities underwriting, trading and sales, 
are an example of the former, whereas back office functions, 
such as clearing and settlement or fund administration, can 
easily be located elsewhere, facilitated by technological 
progress. 
Financial centres have become a dynamic concept, involving 
a deliberate strategy to obtain the brand, and to maintain it. 
Whereas in the past, a financial centre came about 
organically as the hub for a local economy in a whole series 
of transactions that are subject to agglomeration effects, it is 
increasingly part of a deliberate choice and clear strategy by 
policy-makers or market participants. With financial market 
liberalisation and globalisation, financial centres are in open 
competition with each other. Barriers that protected the local 
economy and the local financial centre from competition 
have disappeared and no longer provide a cosy environment. 
Exchanges, banks and insurance companies were privatised, 
barriers to free competition are challenged by EU and WTO 
authorities and tax havens are tackled in concerted action by 
international fora. Hence a forthright and well-defined policy 
is needed to build and maintain a financial centre. Past 
examples of successful strategies in Europe are Dublin and 
Luxembourg. Both emerged from primarily small, local or 
regional centres, without a financial focus, to become 
specialised financial centres with a broader vocation. The 
best well-known example of a new financial centre in the 
making is Dubai. 
Before a financial centre can be developed, some basic 
conditions must be fulfilled. The following are commonly 
accepted to be the basic ingredients: 
•  Successful economy 
•  Open and international 
•  Political/legal stability 
•  Strong human capital base  
•  Sound regulatory and supervisory framework 
•  Lenient tax regime and 
•  Well-developed transport and telecommunications 
infrastructure, robust payment and securities settlement 
systems. 
European financial centres 
Europe hosts the highest concentration of financial centres in 
the world, certainly in number, but most likely also in total 
volume of business. Following the classification discussed 
above, Europe hosts four international financial centres, a 
dozen regional and half a dozen offshore financial centres. 
North America hosts three international financial centres, but 
much fewer regional financial centres, and one offshore 
financial centre, although there are many in the immediate 
neighbourhood in the Caribbean. South-East Asia is 
comparable to the US, although it is rapidly changing, and 
will likely host more financial centres in the future. This 
classification is somewhat arbitrary, since no or only partial 
comparative studies exist on financial centres. Most studies 
that exist are based on surveys and only a few offer hard data 
on the comparative size of financial centres. 
Table 1. Financial centres in Europe, North America and 
South-East Asia, in order of importance (author’s 
own ranking), with GFCI ratings in brackets 
  International 
FCs 
Regional 
FCs 
Offshore FCs 
Europe London  (1) 
Paris (11) 
Frankfurt (6) 
Zurich (5) 
Madrid (34) 
Milan (32) 
Geneva (7) 
Brussels (27) 
Stockholm 
(26) 
Amsterdam 
(16) 
Munich (29) 
Luxembourg 
(17) 
Dublin (15) 
Vienna (35) 
Copenhagen 
(38) 
Athens (46) 
Istanbul  
Jersey (23) 
Liechtenstein 
Monaco 
Guernsey (23) 
Gibraltar  
Isle of Man 
(21) 
Malta 
Cyprus 
Andorra 
North America  New York (2) 
Chicago (8) 
Toronto (13) 
 
San Francisco 
(14) 
Boston (12) 
Washington 
(18) 
Vancouver 
(31) 
Houston 
Bermuda (25) 
South-East 
Asia/Australia 
Tokyo (10) 
Hong-Kong (3) 
Singapore (4) 
Sydney (9) 
Shanghai (30) 
Being (39) 
Seoul (42) 
Osaka (36) 
Macau 
 
London is undoubtedly the leading financial centre in 
Europe, if not in the world. A recent ranking put London at 
the top of the Global Financial Centres Index (GFCI), 
although it is considerably smaller in total financial sector 
employment than New York. Paris follows London very 
closely in total employment, but comes further behind in 
terms of reputation.
2 Frankfurt is much smaller than the two 
top European centres, but has certainly grown in importance 
over the last years, being the seat of the European Central 
Bank. Zurich is probably a border case as an international 
financial centre, but scores high in competitiveness and size, 
together with Geneva. Both are seen to be strong niche 
centres with an international vocation in private banking and 
asset management. 
Of the 50 centres ranked by Global Financial Centres Index, 
almost half are European (24), although there are only four 
in the top ten. Eight financial centres are North-American 
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and seven are in South-East Asia, which again emphasises 
the high concentration, or fragmentation, of financial centres 
in Europe. The GFCI assesses financial centres in terms of 
five key competitiveness areas: people (human capital), 
business environment (regulation and taxation), market 
access (trading volumes and clustering effect), infrastructure 
and general competitiveness, and is based on surveys with 
professionals.  
As can be noticed from Table 2, on some indicators, such as 
total bank assets, the high concentration of financial centres 
in Europe could be justified. On others, however, such as 
national savings or domestic equity market capitalization, 
this seems less warranted. 
Table 2. Main indicators of the size of the Europe’s financial 
markets ($ billion) 
Year  Indicator  World  EU  %  US  %  
2007  GDP  53,352.35  16,574.44  31%  11,535.94 22%
2007  Gross national savings  12,591.15  3,414.33  27%  1,534.28  12%
2006 
Equity domestic 
market capitalisation  50,635.24  13,893.37  27%  19,568.97 39%
2005  Total bank assets  57,165.00  32,429.00  57%  10,242.00 18%
* Data for total bank assets in Europe include Liechtenstein, Norway and 
Switzerland. 
Source: IMF, WFE. 
The impact of EU legislation  
The most important factor of financial centres’ 
competitiveness is regulation, according to the GFCI 2006 
index, before people and skills. Concerns about the level and 
the negative impact of regulation have moved up on the 
agenda in the US, leading to the publication of several 
reports on how to regain its status as the world’s pre-eminent 
financial centre. Europe on the other hand seemingly 
managed to keep the right balance, although it also went 
through a heavy regulatory agenda with the Financial 
Services Action Plan (FSAP). 
The decline of New York has much to do indeed with 
regulation, not only with the negative impact of the 
overreaction to the financial market scandals of the start of 
the century, but also with the capacity of other jurisdictions 
to create the right regulatory environment for a well-
functioning financial system. The figures are telling: the US 
share of global initial public offerings (IPO) – those outside 
a company’s home country – fell from 50 percent in 2000 to 
5 percent in 2005. In 2005, 9 of the 10 largest IPOs took 
place outside the United States. The share of New York’s 
stock exchanges declined from about half of the world’s 
stock-market capitalisation to 37 percent today. In the 
lucrative field of investment banking, sales and trading 
revenues, European revenues are now nearly equal to those 
generated in the US. 
The European regulatory initiatives started well before the 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP). The single market 
programme, launched in 1985, was all about allowing for 
rationalisation and consolidation of financial services 
operations in the EU. The basic rules for the creation of a 
single market are minimum harmonisation and mutual 
recognition. In finance, this means that in the fields of 
banking, insurance or securities markets, regulators agree on 
minimum common prudential standards that are acceptable 
to all the EU member states. On the basis of compliance with 
these basic rules and a licence from the home country 
authorities, financial service providers can provide their 
services throughout the EU, via the so-called ‘single 
passport’. In banking, for example, the second banking 
Directive (1989) established the basic conditions that must 
be met to be allowed to provide banking services in all EU 
member states. The same happened for broker/dealers and 
exchanges in the investment services directive (ISD, 1993) 
and for insurance in the third insurance directives (1992).  
The European single licence allowed banks to group their 
activities and to consolidate their capital base in certain 
financial centres, which has been a clear benefit for places 
like London. The ISD allowed exchanges to sell their 
services all-over the EU, i.e. placing trading screens in other 
member states, which re-directed trading in equity securities 
to the home countries of the listed companies, but it 
maintained their monopoly and thus strengthened the local 
financial centres. In insurance, the minimum solvency 
requirement was not sufficiently harmonised to allow for a 
real single licence in the area of insurance, but it lead to a 
consolidation of activities in the field of large risks. 
The FSAP, launched in 1999, started from the realisation 
that the single financial market with the euro was far from 
perfect, certainly in the area of wholesale financial markets. 
Hence finance ministers decided in May 1999 to launch the 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), or a set of 42 
measures which had to be completed by 2005 to create a 
truly integrated market. And they succeeded: by 2005, 40 of 
the 42 measures had been adopted, with the 2 outstanding 
ones being in the area of company law. Several measures 
under the FSAP have a direct bearing on financial centre 
competition, most importantly the following three crucial 
ones: 1) the prospectus directive, 2) the markets in financial 
instruments directive (MiFID), and 3) taxation on savings 
directive.  
1)  The prospectus directive allows firms to organise 
European-wide, capital-raising exercises on the basis of 
a single document.
3 Whereas previous EU measures for 
pan-European offerings did not work because of an 
insufficient degree of harmonisation, the 2003 
prospectus directive goes for a maximum harmonisation 
of standards, meaning that member states cannot set 
additional requirements for issuers based in their 
jurisdictions, which would than have to be recognised 
mutually between administrations. This means that 
financial centres, where most issuance activity is 
located, can no longer compete on differences in 
standards, or indirectly protect the local centre from 
capital-raising activity by other EU centres. It also 
intensifies competition between financial supervisory 
authorities, which can only compete in supervisory 
performance, not on differences in regulatory standards. 
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The prospectus directive also introduces free choice of 
the home country for approval of the prospectus, and 
thus the issuance, at least for non-equity securities with a 
denomination of at least €1,000 (or the equivalent in 
another currency) and for securities for professionals. It 
means that also from this perspective competition 
between financial centres increases. This is not yet the 
case for equity issuers and non-equity issuers below 
€1,000, which need to have the prospectus vetted in their 
home country, that is, the country where the issuer has 
its registered office.  
The prospectus directive is however not exclusive, 
meaning that it does not stop member states from 
maintaining separate regimes which are not 
‘passportable’, i.e. securities issuance regimes for which 
the single licence does not apply. Some EU financial 
centres reacted to the heavy compliance burden of the 
prospectus directive and created alternative regimes to 
try to pre-empt any possible negative impact on local 
securities issuance. The London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
successfully started the Professional Securities Market, 
which is regulated by the exchange, but which does not 
fall under the new prospectus directive. The 
Luxembourg Exchange created the Euro MTF, which 
does not fall under the prospectus directive either, and 
for which the stock exchange itself acts as listing 
authority. Luxembourg transferred most private bonds to 
its Euro MTF platform. The Irish Stock Exchange from 
its side started the Alternative Securities Market. 
2)  The markets in financial instruments directive (MiFID) 
is beyond doubt the single most important directive of 
the FSAP, and for financial centres.
4 It abolishes the 
monopoly of exchanges and allows internalisation of 
equity trading by banks, and is thus a direct threat for the 
status symbol of financial centres, the stock exchange. 
At the same time, the directive radically upgrades the 
conduct of business requirements for the securities 
trading departments of banks, which are required to 
apply “best execution” rules for retail trades, apply 
know your customer rules and set policies to prevent 
conflicts of interest. These conduct of business rules will 
also apply to all institutional investors when managing 
retail clients’ assets. MiFID is expected to revolutionise 
the capital market landscape in Europe: it will see banks 
operating as exchanges for some activities, exchanges 
offering alternative execution services, and the 
decentralization of order execution among a panoply of 
venues in markets previously governed by concentration 
rules.  
The other part of the revolution to come is the increasing 
competition between financial centres. Although the 
basic MiFID directive was adopted in April 2004, it has 
taken most member states and firms well over 3 years to 
be ready! Almost all member states failed to meet the 
deadline for transposing the text into national law, 1 
February 2007, and about half missed the deadline for 
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application by firms, 1 November 2007.
5 In a few 
member countries – those that were ready in time – 
financial institutions have been regularly informed by 
their authorities two years ahead of implementation 
about what it takes to plan for MiFID. In other big 
states, however, absolutely nothing was circulated until 
a few months before the deadline for application. No 
wonder that also firms were delayed with their 
preparations, or not prepared at all. From a financial 
centre perspective, this means that some will be fairly or 
very well prepared, but many others are not or hardly 
prepared. As EU law is irrevocably applicable from the 
deadline for implementation, those states that were not 
prepared will have no basis on which to stop firms from 
other member states providing services on their territory, 
and leave their own firms incapable of doing the same. 
The MiFID implementation process will therefore be 
characterised by a ‘variable geometry’, where we will 
most likely have not only countries ‘with different 
speeds’ (as in the case of the differentiated EMU), but 
also financial centres, industry sectors, financial 
regulators and end investors ‘with different speeds’ or 
opportunities.  
3)  The taxation of savings directive, adopted in March 
2003 after years of negotiations, could be considered as 
a direct threat to smaller financial centres in the EU, 
which benefited from tax avoidance in high tax 
jurisdictions, and to centres outside the EU, such as 
Switzerland and smaller states.
6 Information exchange 
becomes the norm within the EU, whereas savings in 
third countries will be highly taxed, thus leading to a 
repatriation of savings to the home country, and 
supporting the established financial centres in the EU. 
The directive provides for automatic exchange of 
information concerning interest income derived from 
savings in another Member State from 1 July 2004, 
whereas Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg will until 
2012 apply a withholding tax on savings held by 
residents of other Member States (15% from April 2004, 
20% from January 2007 and 35% from January 2010) 
and share the revenue with the country of residence 
(handing over 75% and keeping 25%). The agreement 
was conditional to "equivalent" measures by six third 
countries (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, 
Switzerland and the United States). The Council 
considered on 21 January 2003 that this condition was 
effectively satisfied in the case of the United States and 
on 3 June 2003 in the cases of Switzerland, 
Liechtenstein, Monaco, Andorra and San Marino.
7 
Under the agreement, Switzerland commits to withhold 
a retention tax also on non-Swiss source income at the 
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same rates as Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria under 
the savings directive. The scope of the agreement 
includes, inter alia, the definition of the paying agent, 
definition of interest, including interest paid on fiduciary 
deposits and by Swiss investment funds. Switzerland 
shares the revenue of the tax withheld on non-Swiss 
source income, transferring 75 per cent of the revenue to 
the tax authorities of the resident's EU member state. 
Identity of taxpayers will only be revealed for all 
criminal or civil cases of fraud. 
The directive has a broad scope, covering interest from 
debt-claims of every kind, including cash deposits and 
corporate and government bonds and other similar 
negotiable debt securities. The definition of interest 
extends to cases of accrued and capitalised interest, 
including so-called "zero-coupon bond" and investment 
funds (UCITS). But loopholes remain, such as trusts and 
life insurance funds.  
European financial centres: A critical future 
Whereas in the past, established financial centres could 
enjoy the quasi protection of national borders, this is less and 
less the case. The most revealing example of this change in 
Europe is the takeover of ABN-AMRO and the reaction by 
the Dutch authorities.  
A Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats (SWOT) 
analysis, often used in management evaluations, is an 
interesting point of departure to examine the competitive 
position of European financial centres. This analysis could 
be further refined for the different leading financial centres 
or clusters. According to a rapid overview, the two most 
important weaknesses of European financial centres are 
labour market rigidities and the continuing market 
fragmentation. Labour market rigidities, with inflexible 
hiring and firing rules, high non-wage labour costs, tax 
disincentives are anathema for financial centres. The flexible 
UK regime, which is an exception to what is in place in most 
other European countries, is often mentioned as one of the 
main elements behind the attractiveness of London. Certain 
continental European banks are said to have moved market 
operations to London precisely for that reason. 
Fragmentation or insufficient harmonisation is another 
burden for the development of European financial centres. 
Although continuing differences in the regulatory and 
supervisory set-up can often be used as a form of 
protectionism by local authorities, it hampers the 
competitiveness of the European financial industry overall. 
The most celebrated example was the takeover of the bank 
Antonveneta in Italy in 2005 by ABN-AMRO bank, which 
led to the dismissal of the governor of the bank of Italy, 
Antonio Fazio, and a European Commission proposal to 
limit the discretionary powers of supervisory authorities.
8 
Other areas that have been insufficiently harmonised so far 
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are securities settlement, taxation (dividend income, 
corporate taxes and VAT) and insurance regulation. 
Regulatory burden, encompassing all the rules coming from 
the EU, is often mentioned as a threat to the competitiveness 
of Europe’s financial centres. This complaint however is 
mostly made in an indiscriminate way. As indicated above, a 
well-balanced regulatory system and well-functioning 
supervisory framework are key competitive factors for 
financial centres. Although the EU has substantially updated 
the regulatory framework in recent years, there is no clear 
indication that the financial industry has suffered. On the 
contrary, in comparison with US, the EU is doing much 
better. Since 2005, the EU overtook the US in several fields 
of capital markets activity, such as the issuance of corporate 
debt and the number and total value of IPOs. Draft directives 
were often heavily criticised for being overly bureaucratic 
and anti-competitive, but a post facto analysis, such as with 
the prospectus directive mentioned above, demonstrates that 
the effects were not negative, on the contrary (see Casey & 
Lannoo, 2005).  
However, this relative strength should be no reason to relax. 
Continuous vigilance is needed by all parties involved to 
make sure that the regulatory set-up matches the need of 
providers and users of financial services. London, for 
example, which has a significant investment in maintaining 
its reputation as a well-regulated financial centre, suffered a 
serious setback when the UK experienced its first bank run 
in 140 years, with the near-default of the mortgage bank 
Northern Rock in September 2007. As observed by the 
director of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), bank 
runs happen in banana republics, not in a world class 
financial centre.
9 
Table 3. A SWOT test as applied to European financial 
centres 
Strengths 
−  Single market & euro 
−  Political stability 
−  Human capital base 
−  Multi-cultural 
−  Regional specialisation 
Weaknesses 
−  Labour market rigidities 
−  Personal income taxation 
−  Fragmentation 
−  Latent protectionism 
−  Lack of service orientation 
Opportunities 
−  EU enlargement 
−  EU’s regional role 
(neighbourhood policy) 
−  Financial innovation 
−  Accumulated wealth 
−  Globalisation 
Threats 
−  Over-regulation 
−  Limited economic growth 
prospects 
−  Financial sector consolidation, 
agglomeration effects 
−  Globalisation 
 
Despite some clear threats, European financial centres also 
have opportunities. The successful enlargements of the EU 
have extended the single market to almost 500 million 
citizens today. In the financial sector, the recent eastward 
enlargements have mainly been to the benefit of the West 
European bank and insurance companies, which control the 
financial sector in Eastern Europe. It is no coincidence that 
none of the new member states hosts a financial centre 
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worthy of that name. Beyond the EU, there is also the 
standard-setting role of the EU for its neighbours, which 
again benefits the financial sector of the EU. In the context 
of association agreements, neighbouring countries are asked 
to adopt the same standards as in place in the EU, which 
facilitates access for EU financial institutions.  
Against this background, the wake-up of European financial 
centres has been rather late. Although London, Paris and 
Frankfurt have for some time promoted the role of their 
financial centre at European and global levels, others have 
only started to appreciate what’s at stake. Amongst the 
established centres, the competition has intensified. An 
interesting example was the election campaign trip on 30 
January 2007 of the then candidate president Nicolas 
Sarkozy to address French nationals working in London.
10 
Sarkozy promised that, if elected, he would tackle some of 
the weaknesses discussed above, such as labour market 
rigidities or high personal tax rates. Only a few days after 
being in office, the French President received a delegation of 
Paris-Europlace, the organisation in charge of promoting the 
role of the Paris financial centre. In October 2007, the 
French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde announced 
measures to promote Paris as an alternative to London, 
proposing amongst others a new segment for initial public 
offerings, falling outside the prospectus directive. However, 
she did not develop proposals to reduce the personal tax rate. 
Among the other financial centres, the initiatives of the 
Dutch authorities and the Swiss financial institutions were 
revealing. As a direct fall-out of the takeover of the biggest 
Dutch bank ABN-AMRO by banks of other EU countries, 
the Dutch Ministry of Finance woke up to the possible 
negative impact on the future of the Dutch financial centre 
and started “The Netherlands: International Financial 
Centre” action plan. It covers, amongst others, the regulatory 
and supervisory environment, the human capital base, 
government’s responsiveness to business needs and the 
corporate tax regime, with no mention again of the personal 
tax matters. In September 2007, the leading Swiss financial 
sector associations announced their action plan to put the 
country among the world’s top three centres of international 
finance by 2015. Amongst the action items figure training, 
efficient regulation and supervision, an internationally 
attractive corporate and fund tax system, and strong financial 
infrastructure, with apparently no mention again of the 
personal tax regime.  
Against this background of intensified competition, smaller 
financial centres in particular will need to be extremely 
vigilant. With a playing field that is increasingly levelled in 
the area of regulation and taxation, many of the points of 
attraction of the past have disappeared, or have been 
hollowed out. Growing consolidation and size enlargement 
in the sector will add pressure to the competitive position. To 
survive, smaller centres should focus on human capital and 
specialisation, as some have already done. With increasing 
specialization and continuing innovation in the sector, niches 
will always remain. The examples of Dublin and 
Luxembourg show what is possible. In addition, given the 
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importance of human capital, personal income tax levels 
leave much room for differentiation. 
So far, data indicate that smaller financial centres have 
withstood the new environment extremely well. Although 
there may have been some decline in the rate of growth of 
bank deposits, the asset management sector has seen 
impressive growth rates.
11 The negative impact of the EU’s 
taxation of savings directive has been limited so far, and 
smaller centres have withstood well the international action 
for more transparency and tighter supervision in the wake of 
9/11. But also for them there is no reason to sit back. 
Maintaining the competitive position of smaller financial 
centres requires strong vigilance at all levels. 
Conclusion 
European financial centres face a future of intensified 
competition, as the single market starts to affect their 
prospects as well. Although the European financial sector is 
thriving, the current strong growth should be no reason for 
complacency. The new EU measures, most importantly the 
prospectus and MiFID directives, directly affect the 
competitive position of financial centres. The prospectus 
directive brings financial centres in open competition with 
each other for bond issuance. MiFID abolishes the monopoly 
of exchanges, allowing trades to be executed wherever 
possible for the lowest price. While the taxation of savings 
directive gives some comfort to the main EU financial 
centres, it should not dissuade them from urgently 
addressing the personal income tax regime, which acts as a 
strong disincentive to finance executives. 
Some financial centres have reacted, in the realization that 
they no longer possess a captive market and therefore need 
to defend their position in a proactive effort between the 
private sector, policy-makers and supervisory authorities. 
Many other centres seem to be only vaguely aware or 
completely unaware of the threats: they are far behind in 
implementing EU directives, notably MiFID, and 
contemplating its strategic implications. They are unmindful 
of the role of the local financial sector for economic growth 
and jobs, and how these could be endangered by increased 
competition, and they fail to promote their role abroad.  
The smaller financial centres seem to have realized this 
threat more acutely than the mid-sized European ones. Given 
their size and their lack of clout compared to their big 
brothers in the international arena, they had to be much more 
attentive to changes in their operating arena, and accordingly 
seem to be withstanding increased competition fairly well. 
But past success is no guarantee for future gains. Caveat 
emptor. 
                                                        
11 See a forthcoming CEPS study on European offshore 
financial centres, to be published in 2008. The Future of Europe’s Financial Centres | 7 
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